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Introduction 
 
Like all academic programs, teaching history at the university level has its own challenges. One 
major challenge in this regard originates from the perspective of the general orientation of the 
curriculum in which the subject is taught. One must note that history is the only social science 
subject that is taught at the secondary and high school level and this program of study is usually 
used for cultivating national identity and instilling loyalty to specific nations. This nationalist 
approach sometimes has created confusion particularly among Muslims due to the universal 
nature of the concept of ummah. This perplexity intensified in the 1990s with the rise of 
globalization in international politics. The clash of civilizations thesis complicated the question 
of identity and loyalty further. What is the impact of the nationalist approach of history 
curriculum on the discipline itself? This raises a fundamental question – what is the purpose 
history curriculum? Should the curriculum be used for indoctrinating students in favor of 
national interests? Or the curriculum is geared toward seeking the truth? Should the approach at 
the university level be different from the high school level? This paper addresses these questions.  
 
Secondary School History Curriculum 
 
A Department of Education document in the United Kingdom defines the purpose of history 
curriculum as:  
 
A high-quality history education will help pupils gain a coherent knowledge and understanding of 
Britain’s past and that of the wider world. It should inspire pupils’ curiosity to know more about 
the past. Teaching should equip pupils to ask perceptive questions, think critically, weigh 
evidence, sift arguments, and develop perspective and judgement. History helps pupils to 
understand the complexity of people’s lives, the process of change, the diversity of societies and 
relationships between different groups, as well as their own identity and the challenges of their 
time.
1
 
 
This apparent positive note on the purpose of studying history at the school level is subject to 
national interests and orientation. How the nations understand their past? Are they allowed “to ask 
perceptive questions, think critically, weigh evidence, sift arguments, and develop perspective and 
judgement?” One professor of criminal law at a leading American university Observes:  
 
Throughout history, it is the stories endlessly told—myth, history, poem, and song—that 
crystallized our view of the world and our place in it. Our ancestors were taught that they were 
part of something larger than themselves, that every person has value, and that we all belong. Our 
children must be taught this same lesson. 
 
Are the “myth, history, poem, and song” for everybody in the nation same? Will a perceptive 
student ask about the validity of the role of myth in the curriculum? Will the history be the same 
for all diverse groups within a nation? How can all children in a given society be taught the same 
lesson? Will the nations be willing to allow questions challenging the “national narrative?” In 
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other words, in reality it would be very difficult for a nation to promote complete independent 
approach toward history. Such a conclusive statement, however, would raise question whether or 
not the purpose of studying history would be seeking the truth or to support and consolidate 
national identity. In an article entitled “History Education and Identity Formation: A Case Study 
of Uganda” Takako Mino says:  
 
Nationalized History education helps build nations because it provides a shared national narrative. 
All of the collective identities examined in Chapter One are founded upon a belief in a common 
past. The national narrative is thus a requisite for the formation of a cohesive national identity. An 
individual’s understanding of her current position in the world is based upon what she remembers. 
Beyond simply teaching the past, History education builds the foundation for an individual’s 
national identity by transmitting the myths and values of the nation.
2
 
 
This approach to history writing challenges not only the global and universal perspective; it 
sometimes even challenges national perspective. In a recent report from South Korea has claimed 
that the government is about to “replace the country's school history books with a single text, 
which will be called the ‘correct history textbook’". The minister of education has claimed that 
"the current history textbooks contain errors in historical facts and contents that have caused 
controversy over ideological bias." "This has been causing confusion over history perception 
among students and also a division in national discourse and social conflicts," he said.
3
 As a 
result more than 50,000 people have signed a petition against the government’s move which has 
been initiated by teachers and academics.  
 
Consequently one may conclude that the secondary school history curriculum in most countries 
is problematic. One could trace the problem in the origin, nature and characteristic of the idea of 
nationalism in Europe in the 19
th
 century and its extension to the Muslim world at the beginning 
of the 20
th
 century.  
 
Growth of Nationalism in Europe and in the Muslim World 
 
The idea of nationalism originated in Europe in the 19
th
 century. There is no precise and widely 
accepted definition of nationalism, but scholars agree with the view that the concept is 
represented in history by independent and sovereign nation-states, which claim the exclusive 
loyalty of their citizens. One historian noted this development in Europe as: 
 
… an age when Christianity was in retreat, (where) nationalism became the dominant spiritual 
force in nineteenth-century European life. Nationalism provided new beliefs, martyrs, and “holy” 
days that stimulated feelings of reverence; it offered membership in a community, which satisfied 
an overwhelming psychological need of human beings for fellowship and identity. And 
nationalism supplied a mission – to which people could dedicate themselves.4 
 
It is precisely on this question of loyalty with nationalism being a spiritual force that the concept 
clashes with that of ummah in Muslim societies. Given that nationalism first developed in 
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Europe, we shall try to understand the concept as it developed in that region and then examine 
how it related to the emergence of nation-states in Muslim lands.  
 
Prior to the Renaissance there were hardly any traces of nationalism, either in Europe or in the 
Islamic world, for there were no nation-states in those days. The object of popular loyalty was 
religion; in Europe, it was Christianity,
5
 and in the Muslim world an individual’s primary loyalty 
was to the Islamic ummah. With the development of nationalism in Europe a Christian became 
an Englishman, a Frenchman, Spanish, or a member of one of the other nationalities. In the 
Muslim world, however, after the initial shock of colonial penetration, as Muslims realized that 
direct armed conflict against European powers would not succeed, the struggle for self-rule took 
a new direction at the end of the 19
th
 century. Muslim leaders recognized the backwardness of 
their society and began to encourage their people to learned European languages, philosophy and 
science. In the process, they also learned about nationalism and began to argue for liberty and 
self-rule on European terms.
6
 They argued that they were different from their European masters 
and that they would like to be governed by their own national cultures and values which were 
recognized and accommodated by the values of Europe. One must note the sharp distinction 
between development of nationalism in Muslim countries and in European countries however. 
While European Enlightenment intellectuals approached the study of society as a reaction against 
the Church and its role in governing society, something which gradually secularized the notion 
of law and government; Muslim intellectuals in the 19
th
 century were conditioned by the 
colonization of their lands. Therefore, while the traditional symbols of nationalism were 
secularized in Europe, they nevertheless still carried religious weight in Muslim surroundings: 
while the Europeans found satisfaction in sacrificing their lives for the glory of the nation, 
Muslims were satisfied with martyrdom and reward in the Hereafter. 
 
The earliest works on nationalism in Muslim countries were published in the 1920’s. Two major 
books on the subject were published both of which were written by Hans Kohn, a Hungarian-
born journalist who participated in the Zionist student movement and who was influenced by 
neo-romantic German nationalism before the First World War.
7
 Later scholars of nationalism 
depended heavily on Hans Kohn’s works, as we shall demonstrate in the following pages. Kohn 
traveled widely in the Middle East as a correspondent for the German newspapers, Frankfurter 
Zeitung and Neue Zurkher Zeitung. Kohn believed that Muslim countries were going through a 
secularization process similar to that of Europe. After observing the development of nationalist 
ideas in Asia, he noted: 
 
A few years back religion was the determining factor in the East. Nationalism is not ousting 
religion, but more or less rapidly taking a place beside it, frequently fortifying it, beginning to 
transform and impair it. National symbols are acquiring religious authority and sacramental 
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inviolability. The truth which men will defend with their lives is no longer exclusively religious; 
on occasion even it is no longer religious at all, but in increasing measure national.
8
 
 
Kohn further observed: 
 
Only twenty-five years ago the Turks, the Arabian, and the Egyptians described themselves first 
and foremost Mohammedans. They were not yet conscious of ethnical designations, or only 
accorded secondary consideration. Today the Mohammedan is primarily a member of his nation 
or a citizen of his state and afterwards a Mohammedan.
9
 
 
On the basis of these observations Kohn formed a theory in the study of social change. He said: 
“Nationalism takes the place of religion as the principle of governing all social and intellectual 
life.”10 We shall demonstrate later, however, that Kohn was wrong. For the moment, however, 
we shall focus on how his expertise on the issue influenced later scholars. 
 
A widely-quoted scholar of nationalism, Harvard professor Rupert Emerson, generalized a 
theory that “the rise of nationalism coincides with the decline in the hold of religion”. He 
supported his view by citing Kohn suggesting: 
 
[He] formulated a universal sociological view which he saw as signifying the transition from 
medieval to modern forms of organization: religious groupings lose power when they confronted 
with the consciousness of a common nationality and speech.
11
 
 
Following Kohn’s “universal sociological theory” Rupert Emerson again theorized the growth of 
nation-states in Asia and Africa saying that: 
 
The nations have come to be accepted as taking priority over claims coming from other source. 
Family, tribe, locality, religion, conscience, economic interest and a host of other appeals may at 
any given time and place prevail over national allegiance for particular individuals or groups. But 
it is the characteristic feature of the national era that for most man the national allegiance takes 
precedence over all other claims which may be made upon them when they are confronted with 
alternative choices of allegiances, as most strikingly in time of war.
12
 
 
In the 20
th
 century, following the dismemberment of three major world empires, the world 
became divided into nation-states. These political entities became the only law-making and law 
enforcement agencies and institutions in the new world. Nation-states formulated policies to 
cultivate national identities through history syllabus at the school level. It should be noted that in 
most Muslim countries national identities were supported by Islamic religious ideas and 
symbols. Historian Wilfred Cantwell Smith has rightly pointed that, “nationalism in Muslim 
                                                 
8
 Hans Kohn, Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East. 19.  
9
 Ibid. 24 
10
 Hans Kohn, A History of Nationalism in the East, 8. 
11
 See Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise of Self- Assertion of Asian and African Peoples 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1960), 158, and the corresponding note on page 436. 
12
 Ibid. 97. 
countries is rather Muslim nationalism.”13 Interestingly like Hans Kohn and Rupert Emerson 
some western orientalists identified and interpreted nationalist developments in many Muslim 
countries and Muslim scholars followed the suit.  
 
Egypt as a Political Community: Nadav Safran 
 
Let us first examine nationalist developments in Egypt. Political reforms in Egypt along the 
European model began under the leadership of Muhammad Ali (1769-1849), an Albanian who 
came to recover Egypt for the Ottomans following the Napoleonic invasion of the country. 
Muhammad Ali initiated the process of reform and modernization in Egypt which was later 
carried out by Muhammad Abduh and others. Scholars generally trace the beginning of the 
Egyptian independence movement to the life and contributions of Mustafa Kamil (1875–1908).14 
Influenced by Jamaluddin al-Afghani’s pan-Islamic thoughts, Kamil was an activist thinker. In 
his short life, he became the leader and the symbol of aspiration for the Egyptian people. His life 
and thought makes an interesting case for the study of identity in Egypt; he mobilized the masses 
against the British rule and shook its foundation, particularly after the Dinshawai event (13 June 
1906).
15
 
 
Explaining the emergence of a nationalist identity in Egypt, Nadav Safran, a Political Scientist, 
quoted one of Kamil’s speeches, saying that: “No civilization will rise in Egypt and be of lasting 
unless it is built on the nation by the nation … unless every one of its members realizes that man 
has certain sacred rights …” 
 
Following this quotation Safran remarks: 
 
Nowhere in the entire speech, or else, did Mustafa Kamil elucidate those ‘sacred rights’ in detail 
nor did he explain and defend the sources from which they derived. One can only assume that he 
meant them in the Western liberal sense since he received a thoroughly Western education and 
moved in Europe circle.
16
 
 
Therefore, Safran believed that Mustafa Kamil wanted to secure Egypt’s freedom from foreign 
control and wanted to adapt European ideas.  
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But Safran is wrong and has made a gross misrepresentation of Kamil’s thought. It is not true 
that Mustafa Kamil did not explain what he had meant by sacred rights. Not only in various 
speeches and writings did he explain that by sacred rights he meant human rights and values 
upheld by Islamic teachings, but in this very speech from which Safran quotes, Kamil clearly 
indicated the source of sacred rights. Let us first examine the internal evidence of the same 
passage that Safran quotes. In this passage when Kamil stated that for a “civilization (to) rise in 
Egypt… (it) will need to be built on the nation by the nation,” he used the word ummah in the 
original Arabic language, and not watan or sha’b which he usually used to denote Egyptian 
nation or the Egyptian people.
17
 
 
Let us now examine other parts of the speech from which Safran quotes. The quotation has been 
taken from the occasion of the 100
th
 anniversary of Muhammad ‘Ali’s accession to power. In 
admiration of Muhammad ‘Ali’s contributions to Egypt Mustafa Kamil said: 
 
The great man changed the situation in Egypt for glory and pride. He reconciled in his actions 
between the fundamentals of contemporary civilization and Islam, for he believed that Islam 
contains teaching concerning all aspects of life which is an ideal that man can never dream of. We 
desire to follow its teachings and accept material benefits from Western civilization…18 
 
This statement by Mustafa Kamil clearly suggests his sources of inspiration. Furthermore, this 
same statement appears within a few paragraphs from where Safran quotes Kamil. It is difficult 
to understand, therefore, how Safran could have missed it. 
 
Most of Mustafa Kamil’s writings and speeches reflect his commitment to Islamic identity in 
general and particularly to the welfare of the Egyptian people. This emphasis on the wellbeing of 
Egypt in Kamil’s writings has been viewed by some scholars as his commitment to Europeanized 
nationalism. Nadav Safran thinks that Kamil’s whole effort was “directed at fostering and 
glorifying the sentiment of nationalism,” and was “oriented toward the modern concept of the 
nation-state as the basic political-social entity.”19 If this observation of Safran were correct then 
this would mean Kamil would have identified Egyptian interests without any consideration for 
universal Islamic values. Safran is wrong. In many of his writings and speeches, Kamil 
expressed his total commitment to universal Islamic teachings on governance. He appreciated 
Muhammad ‘Ali for his commitment to both: to Islam and to material developments in Egypt. It 
does not trouble Kamil that Muhammad ‘Ali was not an Egyptian-born leader, nor did he even 
speak Arabic like other Egyptians. The official relationship between Egypt and the Ottoman 
Sultan did not disturb him. In fact, Kamil not only glorified this Ottoman khedive (governor) of 
Egypt, he also strongly defended the idea of Muslim unity under the leadership of the Ottoman 
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Caliph. He frequently wrote articles in French newspapers and responded to some of his readers’ 
views on Muslim ummah.  
 
It seems that some of his western readers had sympathy for his struggle for Egypt’s freedom and 
independence though they didn’t approve of his Islamic orientation. He therefore asked Western 
audience whether they believed that national rights were legitimate only when they destroyed 
religion. In fact, Kamil suggested that the fanaticism of nationalism (ta’assub) can only be 
controlled by religious teachings. He, therefore, recommended that the education system in 
Egypt should be based on religious values.
20
 He also counseled his Western audience that it was 
due to the teachings of Islam that had historically enabled non-Muslim to live cordially with 
Muslims under the latter’s.21 Kamil never conceived of the rights of Egyptian people (sha’b) 
without Islam. His concern for the entire Muslim world was reflected in Al-‘alam al-Islami, a 
newspaper he edited and published, and which covered events throughout the Muslim world. It is 
for this service that Mustafa Kamil was decorated with the title Pasha by the Ottoman Caliph. It 
should also be noted that he subscribed to the idea of an Ottoman Caliph while most of his 
contemporaries such as Aburrahaman al-Kawakibi (1849-1903) wanted to install an Arab Caliph 
and an Ottoman Foreign Minister. Therefore, it would not only be unfair but also an academic 
crime to suggest that: 
 
…he (Kamil) did not seem to notice the contradiction between the concept of the ummah based 
on common religion, which underlies pan-Islamism, and the modern concept of nation – based on 
secular, political, and geographical and other factors – which is at the root of nationalism.22 
 
Now the question is why Nadav Safran is interested in demonstrating that Mustafa Kamil was a 
nationalist. In our view this was necessary in order to give an Islamic color to Egyptian 
nationalism which became more Europeanized by incorporating its Pharaonic past as Egypt 
moved toward becoming a political community.  
 
Namik Kemal: the Apostle of Liberalism in Turkey? 
 
Turkey moved toward the formation of a nation-state through the Young Turk movement at the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century. But the idea of nationalism in Turkey could be traced in the earlier 
Young Ottoman movement. The most famous and influential among the Young Ottoman 
intellectuals was Namik Kemal (1840–1888).  It is in Namik Kemal’s thought that historians 
generally identify the beginning of the emergence of a new nationalist identity in Turkey.
23
 He 
popularized the term vatan (fatherland) in modern Turkish literature. According to some 
historians, this concept of vatan later led to the establishment of an independent and sovereign 
Turkey which now claimed the absolute loyalty of its inhabitants. His identification with this 
idea of absolute loyalty to the nation-state, however, needs to be re-examined. 
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 In studying Namik Kemal’s life and works it is important to remember that he appeared in 
Turkey’s political arena while Tanzimat reforms were under way. The prime focus of Ottoman 
reform edicts, however, was the position of non-Muslims. At this point, Namik Kemal and his 
fellow intellectuals and patriots stood for the rights of Muslims under the Ottoman rule. Kemal 
believed that the declining Ottoman nation (ummet) could regain its health and strength if it were 
governed in light of Qur’anic principles which demanded rule with the consent of its people. He 
wanted a constitutional government for the Ottomans based on the consensus (Ijma’)24 of the 
Muslim community. He envisioned Ottoman parliament (sura-i-ummet) with the caliph at its 
head, to safeguard the constitution. Namik Kemal says: “In Islam, the good and the bad are 
determined by the Seriet (Shari’ah) which is the expression of the abstract good and the ultimate 
criterion of the truth.”25 For him, it was the Shari’ah or the Islamic principles of governance that 
provided the ultimate values. At the same time, however, he expressed his appreciation for the 
French constitution and admired some French enlightenment philosophers. Kemal expressed 
willingness to accept European technology, media and education to further the material 
development for the Ottomans. In addition to his scholarly writings, he also wrote a number of 
drama and poem through which he popularized his ideas to the masses. 
 
British Orientalist Bernard Lewis considers Namik Kemal the apostle of the idea of fatherland in 
Turkey. In order to justify this claim, Lewis traces the origin and meaning of the word vatan in 
the Turkish language. He equates the French word la patrie with the Turkish Vatan, and quotes 
from a French-Turkish dictionary, published in 1841, and translated vatan as la patrie to support 
his argument.
26
 A deeper examination suggests that Kemal’s use of the word vatan differs 
radically from the French concept of la patrie. In response to an article by Earnest Renan (1823-
1892) who used the idea of la patrie extensively in the French language, Namik Kemal says: 
 
History bears witness that, because of certain differences that appeared among the Muslim 
peoples, all of them have been able to preserve their national identities. However, if anyone asked 
(about his identity) he first say that he is a Muslim and adds that he is, say Circassian or an 
Afghan…27 
 
This undoubtedly indicates Kemal’s clear understanding about the hierarchy of identity of a 
citizen of the Ottoman state. He also clearly expressed his commitment to shari’ah. He believed 
that the universal standards of justice could be best fulfilled by practicing prescriptions of 
shari’ah; and a good government being that which fulfils its commandments.28 The French 
concept of la patrie, on the other hand, originated with the Jacobins during the French 
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Revolution. The French commitment to la patrie was reflected in a letter by a young soldier to 
his mother during the Revolution saying, “When la patrie calls us for her defense, we should 
rush to her. … Our life, our goods, and our talents do not belong to us. It is to the nation, to la 
patrie, to which everything belongs.”29 Kemal’s Ottoman identity didn’t enjoy such 
unconditional loyalty; they were conditioned by Qur’anic values. 
 
Bernard Lewis misrepresents Namik Kemal perhaps because of the latter’s appreciation of the 
role of the French parliament and constitution in achieving the rights of the French people. For 
Kemal right and human dignity must originate from Islamic teachings. The Turkish historian 
Serif Mardin rightly points out that, “He (Namik Kemal) believed that the Shari’ah includes all 
that could … be counted as a constitution, both the fundamental structure of the government and 
the fundamental rights of the subjects.”30 
 
Bernard Lewis considers Kemal’s appreciation of French thought as an attempt to synthesize 
European and Islamic ideas. This, according to the former, was a task akin to earlier attempt of 
marrying Aristotelian philosophy and Qur’anic theology, involving a reinterpretation of both.31 
This is an unjust claim on the part of Lewis, because he fails to point out where Kemal deviated 
from the basic teachings of the Qur’an. Kemal was convinced that the members of the Ottoman 
parliament would be committed to Islam. He knew that the number of non-Muslim inhabitants in 
the Ottoman territories was very small and also that the shari’ah had already secured the rights 
of non-Muslims in society. One could see evidence of this throughout the history of Islam. What 
was necessary was putting the values of the shari’ah into practice. Therefore, he never 
distinguished between Ottoman and Islamic ideals and values. Bernard Lewis, however, 
demonstrates his frustration on Namik Kemal by saying: 
 
Namik Kemal, the apostle of liberal patriotism, adopts a milder tone (toward nationalism in 
Turkey), but he too, in his patriotic writings shows that he never really distinguished between 
what was Ottoman and what was Islamic.
32
 
 
Here again, Bernard Lewis fails to note that there was little room for race or language in Kemal’s 
concept of vatan. His Ottoman nationality was based on Islamic teachings. In this sense then it 
would be a mistake to consider Kemal as an apostle of modern Turkish nationalism mainly 
because 20
th
 century Turkish nationalists adopted a policy of westernization and heavily relied 
on the Turkish ethnic identity.  
 
In order to address the question of whether Namik Kemal can be considered such an apostle, it is 
necessary to define the term ‘liberal patriotism.’ In his statement, Lewis does not define the term. 
If patriotism means one’s emotional attachment to his supreme identity, then the question arises 
of what that identity is? For Namik Kemal it was his Ottoman-Islamic identity that was supreme. 
It should be noted here that he was not the first Muslim in history to identify himself as a Muslim 
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as well as a native of a particular geographical territory. After all, it was not long before that 
Algerian Muslims fought against the French (1840s) under the leadership of Abdul Qadir, and 
that Indian Muslims fought a war of independence against the British (1857) on the basis of their 
local geographical and Muslim Identities. 
 
In this context it should remembered that the ‘constitution of Madinah’ adopted by the Prophet 
declared the city of Madinah a sacred place for its inhabitants irrespective of their tribal and 
religious identities. Therefore, a Muslim fighting for the city of Madinah was fighting for Islam 
as well. For him his Muslim identity and Madinian identity were not in conflict: they were 
mutually supportive. But for the Makkans who had migrated to Madinah the situation was 
different. When the Makkans attacked Madinah, the migrant Muslims choose to abandon their 
Makkan identity in favor of their Muslim identity which was based on universal Qur’anic values. 
As for Namik Kemal, he perceived no conflict between his Ottoman and Islamic identities. All 
through his life he struggled against the Ottoman-Muslim misrule and European political and 
intellectual domination. This was true for most of his contemporaries. They considered 
themselves “nothing but a member of a Muslim state.”33 This is true, not only for Ottoman 
Turkey, but for all Muslim territories under European rule. 
 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, under the impact of European thought, a clear shift 
had taken place from a distinct Ottoman identity to Turkish nationalist identity with the 
emergence of the Young Turk movement. Clearly Young Turks were more secularized than the 
Young Ottomans. Our question in this context is – why Bernard Lewis is interested in depicting 
an Islamic color to Turkish nationalism and attempts to identify Namik Kemal as the “apostle of 
liberal patriotism” in the discussion about the growth of Turkish nationalism. Lewis seems to 
have wanted to suggest that Turkish nationalism began with an Islamic tone but later slowly it 
turned to be Europeanized and secular. Therefore Turkey and the rest of the Muslim world would 
follow what Rupert Emerson had called “the universal sociological theory.” But this didn’t 
happen in the Muslim world: Islam didn’t take the back seat in the Muslim world as did 
Christianity in 19
th
 century Europe. Perceptive Lewis realized earlier than other orientalists. In 
article in January 1976 in the magazine Commentary he noted “The Return of Islam.”34  
 
By the middle of the 20
th
 century many Muslim majority territories emerged as independent and 
sovereign nation-states in international politics and each nation developed its own national 
history curriculum to satisfy its national needs. On the other hand, however, Muslim majority 
nation-states established Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 1969 to promote Muslim 
agendas internationally. Although the OIC confronted with formidable challenges in garnering 
member-state’s support for cooperative developments, the institution continued to remind 
Muslims of their traditional identity in international politics. This identity consciousness received 
more prominence at the end of the century through the appearance of the clash of civilizations 
thesis in international politics. It should be noted that the orientalist Bernard Lewis played a 
significant in the emergence of the thesis. 
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Clash of Civilizations Thesis and Approaches of Studying History 
 
The collapse of the former Soviet Union provided a fresh opportunity for historians such as 
Bernard Lewis to manipulate Muslim history. Although the idea of clash of civilizations 
originally came from Lewis,
35
 it was Samuel P Huntington who popularized the thesis. 
Huntington believes that a war in our contemporary times involving the core states of the world’s 
major civilizations is “highly improbable but not impossible.”36 At the end of the cold war as he 
searches for enemies Huntington provokes his readers to imagine a possible scenario of a “global 
civilizational war” in which “the United States, Europe, Russia and India …become engaged in a 
truly global struggle against China, Japan, and most of Islam” in the year 2010. Such a conflict 
may spark and escalate “if aspiring Muslim core states compete to provide assistance to their 
coreligionists.”37 It should be noted, however, that even though Huntington puts China and Japan 
on the side of “most of Islam,” the major part of his work discusses the potential for conflict 
between Muslims and the United States.  
 
Why should “most of Islam” turn against “the United States, Europe, Russia and India” in the 
“global civilizational war”? Huntington believes that the reason for it was that with the passage 
of time the Muslim world was becoming more Islamic and thus increasing the potential threat to 
Western civilization in international politics. Around the same time as the OIC was founded by 
Muslim countries, Huntington observes: 
 
Beginning in the 1970s, Islamic symbols, beliefs, practices, institutions, policies, and organizations 
won increasing commitment and support throughout the world of 1 billion Muslims stretching from 
Morocco to Indonesia and from Nigeria to Kazakhstan. … In 1995 every country with predominantly 
Muslim population, … was more Islamic and Islamist culturally, socially and politically than it was 
fifteen years ago.
38
 
 
In response to these developments Muslim “political leaders rushed to identify their regimes and 
themselves with Islam,” observes Huntington:  
 
King Hussein of Jordan, convinced that secular governments had little future in the Arab world, 
spoke of the need to create “Islamic democracy” and a “modernizing Islam.” King Hassan of 
Morocco emphasized his descent from the Prophet and his role as “Commander of the faithful.” The 
Sultan of Brunei, not previously noted for Islamic practices, became “increasingly devout” and 
defined his regime as a “Malay Muslim monarchy.” Ben Ali of Tunisia began regularly to invoke 
Allah in his speeches and “wrapped himself in the mantle of Islam” to check the growing appeal of 
Islamic groups. In the early 1990s Suharto explicitly adopted a policy of becoming “more Muslim.” 
In Bangladesh the principle of “secularism” was dropped from the constitution in the mid 1970s, and 
by early 1990s the secular, Kemalist identity of Turkey was, for the first time, coming under serious 
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challenge. To underline their Islamic commitment, governmental leaders — Ozal, Suharto, 
Karimov — hastened to their hajh.39 
 
In order to convince his readers of the violent nature of the relationship between Islamic and 
Western civilizations, Huntington quotes Bernard Lewis, whom he refers as “a leading Western 
scholar of Islam,” and argues that there exists “no less than a clash of civilizations.” He provides 
empirical data from history, claiming that “50 percent of wars involving pairs of states of 
different religions between 1820 and 1929 were wars between Muslims and Christians.”40 
Although a number of Muslims viewed European colonialism as a continuation of medieval 
crusades, in academic terms Bernard Lewis’ argument is pretty trivial. This is because during the 
colonial period, when most of Africa and Asia were under the occupation of European powers, it 
was only incidental that most of Europe supposedly followed Christianity (‘supposedly’ because 
most Europeans were deists and followed no organized religion during the second half of the 
19th century) and most of Africa and Asia was populated by Muslims. History books have 
recorded these conflicts as anti-colonial or nationalist struggles to achieve self-determination. 
History has also recorded that one of the major contributions of the United States to world 
civilization is that it introduced the idea of self-determination in modern times. The US not only 
fought a war of independence against European colonization, but it also hard-pressed the world 
bodies such as Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and later the United Nations to undertake the 
diplomacy of decolonization.
41
 Huntington now seems to want the United States to abandon its 
historical role to promote Enlightenment values such as freedom of conscience and respect for 
human dignity and to assume the historical burden of Europe’s Christendom.  
 
In support of his thesis Huntington argues: 
[i]t is hard to find statements by any Muslims, whether politicians, officials, academics, 
businesspersons, or journalists, praising Western values and institutions. They instead stress the 
differences between their civilization and Western civilization, the superiority of their culture, and 
the need to maintain the integrity of that culture against Western onslaught. Muslims fear and resent 
Western power and the threat which this poses to their society and beliefs. They see Western culture 
as materialistic, corrupt, decadent, and immoral.
42
  
 
Huntington believes that since the “1979 Iranian Revolution, an inter-civilizational quasi war 
developed between Islam and the West,”43 and in the near future “conceivably even more 
intensely anti-Western nationalisms could emerge, blaming the West for the failures of Islam.”44 
Therefore, there is strong likelihood of a perpetual conflict between the two civilizations. He 
believes that, “[the] problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different 
                                                 
39
 Ibid., 115. 
40
 Ibid., 210. It is interesting that Huntington finds 50 percent of wars involving Muslims and Christians during this 
period. However, he forgets that during this most volatile century in the fourteen centuries of Christian-Muslim 
relations the two communities taken together constituted at least 70 to 75 percent of the world population. It is also 
noteworthy that most members of the UN are either Christian or Muslim majority: out of the current 192 member 
states at least 169 have clear Christian or Muslim majority or a combination of both.  
41
 Although the US never officially joined the world body, President Woodrow Wilson’s idea of national self-
determination laid the foundation of the League of Nations.  
42
 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 213. 
43
 Ibid., 216. 
44
 Ibid., 121. 
civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with 
the inferiority of their power.”45 He reiterated his thesis in an article entitled “The Age of 
Muslim Wars” saying that “throughout the Muslim world, … there exists a great sense of 
grievance, resentment, envy and hostility toward the West and its wealth, power and culture.”46 
In order to establish his thesis Huntington manipulated the history of both civilizations. 
Introducing the discussion on “Islam and the West” during the Clinton administration, 
Huntington suggests that: 
 
Some Westerners, including President Bill Clinton, have argued that the West does not have 
problems with Islam but only with violent Islamist extremists. Fourteen hundred years of history 
demonstrate otherwise. The relations between Islam and Christianity, both Orthodox and 
Western, have often been stormy. Each has been the other’s Other.47 
 
Huntington’s knowledge of history of both Islamic and Western civilizations seems awkward. 
While a thorough analysis of the historical relationship between Islam and Christianity does not 
fall within the scope of this paper, Huntington’s claims do call for taking a look at history. 
Anyone with even an elementary knowledge of Islam and Islamic history knows that the Qur’an 
does not single out Christians as the enemies of Muslims. In fact it encourages Muslims to 
develop friendly relations with them not only because the latter affirm God’s existence, but also 
because they believe in many Prophets such as Abraham, Isaac, Joseph, Moses (peace be on 
them) and several others mentioned both in the Bible and the Qur’an. In fact when the Muslims 
were persecuted by their fellow tribesmen in Makkah they sought refuge with the Christian King 
of Ethiopia. The Qur’an also showed a sympathetic tilt toward the Byzantine Christians when 
military encounters took place between them and the Persians (see Qur’an 30: 2–7). In this 
context, one may refer to the seminal work by Professor Richard Bulliet, The Case for Islamo-
Christian Civilization, which perceives a close relationship between Islam and Christianity in 
history and thus seems discordant with Bernard Lewis’ view of “Judeo-Christian heritage).”48 
However, one needs to carefully examine Huntington’s proposition that Christians and Muslims 
persistently constitute “the other’s Other.”  
 
In fact, the Qur’an does not identify any specific religious, linguistic or ethnic group as its 
enemy; rather, it strongly condemns those who hide the truth as regards the existence of the One 
True Lord and attempt to become lords over others.
49
 The Qur’an claims that such people spread 
corruption on earth in order to establish their lordship over others, especially over the poor and 
the weak.
50
 It is well-known that the earliest enemies of Islam were the Prophet’s own fellow 
tribesmen, the Quraysh. The message of Islam attracted not only people from the Quraysh, but 
also from various other groups of people of non-Arab ethnic background—the Africans, the 
Persians, etc. who lived in Arabia. In other words, Islam’s message was universal and therefore 
one could find both friends and foes among all kinds of people. This is not to necessarily suggest 
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that Muslim rulers in history never looked upon or treated Christians with hostility; rather, it is 
meant to stress that there has not been any specific “Other” for Islam.  
 
It is also not true that Muslims always constituted the “Other” for Christians. Christianity was 
born as a reform movement within the Jewish tradition and the two communities — Christians 
and Jews — remained, in a sense, each other’s “Other” during the early days of Christianity. 
Huntington romanticizes Christian history by suggesting that the “twentieth-century conflict 
between liberal democracy and Marxist-Leninism is only a fleeting and superficial historical 
phenomenon compared to the continuing and deeply conflictual relation between Islam and 
Christianity.”51 Perhaps the cold war is too close in time to be erased from the memory of 
Huntington’s readers. However, can one obliterate the memories of the Crusades, especially the 
Crusaders’ brutalities against Orthodox Christians? It is also evident that while in the Hundred 
Years War (1337–1453) and the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) much innocent blood was 
spilled. Muslims were no party to these long-drawn wars. Likewise, in the two World Wars of 
the twentieth century which witnessed death and destruction a genocidal kind, the key players 
were Europeans/ Westerners and Christians. The same holds true for the cold war between the 
Eastern and Western blocks which constantly cast its ominous shadows over the world for about 
half a century.  
 
More astonishing is the fact that Huntington ignores the motivating factors behind the American 
War of Independence. There has been an explosion of reference to the Judeo-Christian heritage 
of the American Republic during the past decade or so. The fact, however, is that like many 
Enlightenment philosophers the founding fathers of America too were religious people, albeit 
vehemently anti-clerical. Possibly they had learned about the principles of human rights and 
human dignity from Judaism and Christianity which were an important source of their ideas. 
However, these ideas are not only common to the classical Greek tradition of Socrates and Plato 
which Renaissance attempted to revive but also to Islam. A student of history can hardly fail to 
take note of these facts. Doubtlessly there has also been conflict between Muslims and Christians 
during the fourteen hundred years of history. Despite that, it is an exaggeration to say that 
Muslims and Christians have been each other’s “Other” throughout history, something 
Huntington suggests.  
 
Looking broadly at the record of conflict between Muslims and European Christendom one finds 
that both parties have committed incursions into each other’s territories. There have also 
occurred telling events such as the atrocities committed by the Crusaders during the occupation 
of Jerusalem in 1096. However, the Catholic Church, after a lapse of considerable time admitted 
that mistakes had been made. As for the relationship during the European colonial penetration 
into the Muslim world, most historians now acknowledge that the record of the European 
colonizers in Asia and Africa has been pretty harsh and brutal. Huntington’s claim that Muslims 
possess a “sense of grievance, resentment, envy and hostility toward the West and its wealth”52 is 
inaccurate and he fails to provide any evidence to support this contention. As for the Muslims’ 
present resentment against European colonizers, it should be viewed in its proper historical 
context. The Muslims’ resentment is substantially no different from that of those Asians and 
Africans who experienced European colonization, Muslims or otherwise. It needs no 
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extraordinary perspicacity to appreciate that every group of people instinctively resents being 
exposed to subjection and exploitation. That is why one needs to highlight the point that the 
conflict between the European colonizers and the Muslims of Asia and Africa originated in the 
course of the latter’s effort to achieve freedom and self-determination and not as an indignant 
response to the “wealth, power, and culture” of the former. In fact pre-colonial Africa and Asia 
were pretty well off to covet the wealth, power and culture of the European nations.  
 
Should the Historian Seek for the Truth or Justify National Interests  
 
What should then be the approach to history teaching at the university level? Should students of 
history be encouraged and trained to seek the truth or should they be trained to promote 
perceived national interests? Are national interests always motivated by historical truths or they 
are sometimes influenced by vested interests? These questions may be raised in light of our 
above discussion. A university by definition stands for an institution of higher learning that 
promotes advanced education and research universally. Therefore, in our view, the university 
history curriculum must be committed to finding the truth. 
 
However this doesn’t mean that a nation shouldn’t be allowed to promote and strengthen identity 
and loyalty of its citizens. But the challenging task would be how to achieve this goal with 
complete commitment to discovery of the truth. Have all nations always upheld the truth in 
history? Do all citizens of a given nation agree with the nationalist rhetoric about their history? 
We have recorded earlier in this essay a story of disagreement between the government and the 
opposition in South Korean history curriculum. Aren’t such controversies common in most 
nations? In our view these are important and relevant questions in the current context. Will it be 
too sensitive to introduce a rational and critical approach to history lessons? This is a politically 
loaded question. Interestingly most nations and universities are interested in cultivating critical 
thinking skills in their citizens and students. Many universities around the world have introduced 
separate courses on critical thinking. In our view critical thinking is methodology rather than a 
course. Critical methodology may be applied in many courses. In fact, in our view, the history 
curriculum would provide the most appropriate platform for their understanding national identity 
and their role as responsible citizens. Essentially the curriculum should be based on values. In 
our view value-based curriculum would create enduring trust which is necessary becoming a 
responsible citizen. In our view, a value-based history curriculum will serve this purpose.  
 
